Consciousness as a Misleading Construct: Toward a Process-Based Account of Mind

The concept of consciousness is widely used across neuroscience and philosophy of mind, yet it lacks a stable and consistent definition. It is variously equated with subjective experience, awareness, attention, reportability, and self-related processing. This paper argues that consciousness does not correspond to a unified or distinct phenomenon, but is instead a linguistic construct that compresses multiple separable processes under a single term. I propose that what is commonly labeled as consciousness can be decomposed into interacting neurocognitive processes, including predictive modeling, attentional selection, valuation, memory integration, and interoceptive regulation. These processes operate continuously and do not form a discrete state that the brain enters or exits. From this perspective, the apparent unity of conscious experience is an emergent consequence of coordinated regulation rather than evidence of an underlying entity. Drawing on predictive processing frameworks and contemporary cognitive neuroscience, this account reframes long-standing conceptual problems, including the explanatory gap. By abandoning the assumption of consciousness as a natural kind, research can focus on measurable dynamics and interactions, providing a more precise and empirically grounded account of mind.