arXiv (All)
open access
Application Agnostic EM Side-Channel Emanations of the FPGA Clock Distribution Network
Electromagnetic side channels have been extensively utilized in non-invasive attacks or analyses to extract critical information from deployed systems. Most of the attacks or analyses are typically executed on cryptographic algorithms under the assumption that the underlying implementation remains f
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Tick-Tock on the Open Fronthaul: Securing Synchronization in O-RAN#1037208
- Tick-Tock on the Open Fronthaul: Securing Synchronization in O-RAN#1028645
- Pre-Characterization of Electromagnetic Side-Channel Leakage Using Publicly Available Information: A Case Study on E-Voting Interfaces#224414
- Analog Pin Directionality as an Exfiltration Attack Surface in Mixed-Signal ICs#1013318
- Analog Pin Directionality as an Exfiltration Attack Surface in Mixed-Signal ICs#965319
Record · ID 1117993
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive