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Expectation-enforcing strategies for repeated games
Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can shape the incentives for the opponent in a predetermined way.
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