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On the Geographic Incentives of Multiple Concurrent Proposers
We study whether systems with multiple concurrent proposers (MCP) incentivize the geographic decentralization of proposers. In our model, concurrent proposers strategically choose their locations to maximize their captured market share of users, who decide where to send transactions by comparing eac
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