arXiv (OAI Expanded)
open access
When Does Selfishness Align with Team Goals? A Structural Analysis of Equilibrium and Optimality
This paper investigates the relationship between the team-optimal solution and the Nash equilibrium (NE) to assess the impact of self-interested decisions on team performance. In classical team decision problems, team members typically act cooperatively towards a common objective to achieve a team-o
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition#942153
- Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination#746994
- Team reasoning, framing, and cooperation#736954
- Game Theory and Behavioral Insights in Economic Decision Making#237854
- Co-Investment with Payoff-Sharing Mechanism for Cooperative Decision-Making in Network Design Games#1036567
Record · ID 1123944
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive