arXiv (OAI Expanded)
open access
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem as a Generalisation of Condorcet's Paradox
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a seminal result of Social Choice Theory that demonstrates the impossibility of ranked-choice decision-making processes to jointly satisfy a number of intuitive and seemingly desirable constraints, including that aggregated preferences are transitive. The theorem is
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The Perversity of Weighted Voting#80676
- Is Agent Causation Possible?#697029
- The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions#741025
- Three Unique Virtues of Approval Voting#725601
- Determinism and Luck#721434
Record · ID 1123954
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive