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From Preference to Reciprocity: Decentralized Matching with Empirically Grounded LLM-agent Based Modeling
Bipartite matching is a fundamental problem in game theory and market design. Classical approaches such as Gale--Shapley assume complete preferences and centralized computation, whereas many real-world matching processes are decentralized, asynchronous, and shaped by sequential interaction under lim
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