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The Power of Simple Mechanisms: A Tight $e$-Approximation for Gains from Trade in Matching Markets
We study how well simple mechanisms approximate gains from trade (GFT) in two-sided matching markets with independent buyer values and seller costs, where feasible outcomes form an arbitrary downward-closed family of matchings. This model includes bilateral trade and double auctions as special cases
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