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Delegation without Priors
A principal relies on information held by a biased agent in decision-making. Without a prior over the circumstances that may arise, she designs a delegation rule to minimize the worst-case regret. Optimal delegation combines a default action, a fixed gap above it, and a higher discretionary interval
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