PhilArchive
open access
El mito del yo y la experiencia consciente
In Consciousness Studies it is common to distinguish between subjective character and qualitative character. It is also non unusual to maintain that both can be analyzed independently. This is called the “division of conceptual labor”. This idea, however, does not match with our intuitive insight that subjective character is multiple. Here I identify the idea of the division of conceptual labor as a version of the myth of the self, and I push forward two arguments against it. After that, I will propose an alternative characterization of subjectivity on conscious experience. My main conclusion is that, in order to define the subjective character, we do need the qualitative character. The self needs the other.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Three Types of Rationality in the Ontology of the Subject-in-Itself-Object: Objective, Subjective, and Aesthetic#725353
- Mathematical Quality and Experiential Qualia#78337
- Embodiment and the inner life: cognition and consciousness in the space of possible minds#697161
- Aphantasia and Conscious Thought#77032
- Artificial Consciousness Is Morally Irrelevant#88312
Record · ID 112980
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive