arXiv (All)
open access
Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism with Constant Maximin-Share Guarantee
We study the truthful and fair allocation of indivisible goods to $n$ strategic agents with additive valuations. Babaioff, Feige, and Manaker Morag [FOCS 2026] gave a randomized mechanism that uses only the agents' rankings of the goods, is truthful in expectation (TIE), and guarantees every agent $
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Maximin Share Allocations Beyond Weakly Lexicographic Valuations#1154782
- Pairwise Maximin Share Allocations Need Not Exist#973869
- Keep Everyone Happy: Online Fair Division of Numerous Items with Few Copies#821391
- Subquadratic Subsidies for Nonnegative or Nonpositive Valuations#985643
- Non-Existence of PMMS Allocations and a $4/3$-PMMS Guarantee for Additive Chores#997365
Record · ID 1130323
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive