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Delegation or competition: optimal liquidation across dark and lit pools with information privilege
We study the optimal liquidation problem in both dark and lit pools for an investor delegating the execution of a large position to a broker, in a continuous-time setting with market impact and execution uncertainty. First, we design an optimal compensation scheme between the investor and a broker w
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