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Minimizing Inequity in Facility Location Games
This paper studies the problem of minimizing group-level inequity in facility location games on the real line, where agents belong to different groups and may act strategically. We explore a fairness-oriented objective that minimizes the maximum group effect introduced by Marsh and Schilling (1994).
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