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Full Justified Representation in Temporal Voting: Efficient Computation and Verification
In temporal voting, a fixed set of voters makes a collective decision in each of several rounds, and proportionality requires that groups with shared interests be represented across these decisions. Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest proportionality axioms known to be satisfi
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