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Auctions with Price Predictions
We design auctions for the sale of a single item with unlimited supply given a single prediction of the revenue-maximizing uniform price. This departs from prior work on auctions with predictions which typically assumes predictions of every bidder's value. Our main result is a characterization of th
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