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Kyle meets time-inconsistency: a dynamic mean--variance informed trading problem
We study a Kyle--Back model in which the informed trader has dynamic mean--variance preferences, leading to a time-inconsistent trading problem that is formulated as an intrapersonal game. The model combines two equilibrium requirements: a trading--pricing equilibrium between the informed trader and
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