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Entropic Risk-Sensitive Evolutionary Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games
We study risk-sensitive evolutionary learning dynamics and their long-run equilibrium selection behaviors in coordination games. Agents' risk attitudes enter through the classical entropic risk measure, which evaluates opponent-induced payoff uncertainty and feeds into noisy best responses under two
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