arXiv (All)
open access
Defense Feedback and Global-Game Selection
Global games select a unique cutoff when a player's incentive moves monotonically with private information. We show that this logic can fail when a privately informed participant can take a costly, simultaneous, and unobserved action that defends the status quo. In a currency-attack model, the defen
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The puzzle of competitive fairness#71491
- Deception in Sender–Receiver Games#751081
- Towards a resolution of terrorism using game theory coalitions, negotiations and audience costs#648879
- Beyond Incentive Compatibility: Rational Harm-Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms#1115961
- Repeated-Game Security for Restaking-Based Verifiable Inference#441701
Record · ID 1154946
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive