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CausalArmor: Efficient Indirect Prompt Injection Guardrails via Causal Attribution
AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer
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