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Oblivious Learning and Collusive Pricing
On a platform with many sellers, should a pricing algorithm explicitly model competitors' prices when learning demand? Classical arguments suggest that ignoring competitors induces model misspecification and inefficiency, yet findings from algorithmic collusion suggest that ignoring competitor price
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