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Accountability Among Allies: Intra-Party Competition and the Electoral Cost of Scandal
When do voters electorally punish politicians for scandals? We argue that a scandal changes votes only when it can tip voters who are near indifference between candidates, and that intra-party contests place far more voters in that position than inter-party contests. We formalize this argument in a
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