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Condorcet-Winning Sets and Peer Selection in Planar Metric Elections
In ranked-choice voting, a Condorcet-winning set is a group of candidates for which no outside candidate is preferred to every member of the group by a majority of voters. We study Condorcet-winning sets in planar metric elections, where voters rank candidates according to their distance under a giv
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