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Social Optimality Does Not Imply Coalitional Stability in Unweighted Max-k-Cut Games
In Max-$k$-Cut games, optimal colorings maximize social welfare, but are they stable against coordinated deviations that strictly benefit every participating player? A recurring conjecture in the literature asserts that, for unweighted graphs, every optimal coloring has this stability property, know
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