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Maximally Diverse Stable Matchings: Optimizing Arbitrary Institutional Objectives
Stable matching provides the theoretical foundation for many centralized market mechanisms. However, modern matching markets often require additional distributional objectives, such as diversity constraints and regional quotas, which may conflict with classical stability. Existing approaches typical
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