The Amplifier Effect: Human-Factor Risks of AI-Suggested Correlation and Auto-Propagation in Multi-Framework GRC Self-Assessment

The Amplifier Effect: Human-Factor Risks of AI-Suggested Correlation and Auto-Propagation in Multi-Framework GRC Self-Assessment N. Kekatos1 , M. Ioannou2 , M. Korgiala-Karyda3 , A. Lekidis3 , T. Nianios1

arXiv:2610.07866v1 [cs.CR] 6 Oct 2026

1 Clone Systems, Cyprus – {nkekatos, tnianios}@clone-systems.com 2 Bolton Technologies, Cyprus – michael@bts.com.cy 3 University of Thessaly, Greece – alekidis@uth.gr, korgialamarina@gmail.com

Abstract—Multi-framework Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) platforms increasingly automate the link between an organisation’s self-assessment answer and the compliance obligations that answer is said to satisfy. Cross-framework control mapping, AI-suggested question correlation, and automatic propagation of answers and evidence across correlated questions all serve the legitimate efficiency goal of reducing duplicate work for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) under the EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), NIS2 and GDPR. The same mechanisms, however, amplify the consequences of any human-factor bias in a single answer: one optimistically-graded control, one rubberstamped attestation, or one AI-drafted answer can be silently replicated as evidence of compliance with many obligations across multiple frameworks. We call this the amplifier effect: a platform-design property (coarse-grained attestation and ungated propagation) rather than a failing of individual users. Using two EU-funded SME-facing GRC platforms, CYBERFORT and CYBER-BRIDGE, as examples, we (i) describe the amplification mechanism in concrete data-model terms, (ii) propose a sixdimension scoring framework for evaluating any GRC tool’s exposure to the effect, (iii) instantiate the framework on a thirteen-tool comparison covering enterprise IRM, mid-market platforms, compliance-automation tools, and the two EU SME projects, and (iv) outline a measurement protocol that a consortium with access to production self-assessment data can run. The thirteen-tool comparison is a structured design assessment, not an empirical measurement of user behaviour. The EU SME platforms score lowest on the amplifier dimensions because their burden-reduction design deliberately trades sign-off granularity for throughput; we report this as a design trade-off, not a verdict on the platforms. Our contribution is the framing and the measurement protocol. Index Terms—Cyber Resilience Act, NIS2, self-assessment, GRC, human factors, compliance automation, cross-framework mapping, AI-assisted assessment, SME cybersecurity

I. I NTRODUCTION The EU regulatory stack for cyber resilience is shifting from periodic external audit toward continuous self-assessment as the default evidence of compliance. The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) [1] obliges manufacturers of products with digital elements to perform and update © 2026 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. This work has been accepted for publication at the 2026 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (IEEE CSR 2026).

a cybersecurity risk assessment over the product lifecycle; NIS2 (Directive (EU) 2022/2555) [2] requires essential and important entities to adopt risk-management measures proportional to exposure; DORA places equivalent recurring duties on the financial sector [3]; the EU AI Act [4] adds AIsystem risk management to the same regulatory scope. Each of these regimes ultimately depends on the truthfulness and the consistency of an organisation’s own answers. Two structural responses to this shift are now visible in the GRC tool market. First, modern GRC/IRM platforms [7] converge on a multi-framework data model: a single control or evidence object is mapped against several frameworks simultaneously, so an SME does not redo the same work for CRA, ISO/IEC 27001, NIS2, and GDPR [21]. Second, AI assistance is now embedded inside the assessment workflow itself: LLM-drafted policies, AI-suggested mappings between questions, AI-generated readiness narratives, and retrievalaugmented advisory [22]. Both responses are legitimate gains in efficiency (though, as we argue in §VIII, not necessarily in usability, which is the broader property). They also, individually and especially in combination, create a measurement problem that the humanfactor literature has not yet named. We call it the amplifier effect: the property that, in a modern multi-framework GRC platform, a single human assessment action can drive many compliance assertions, across many frameworks, with no proportional increase in human review. Framed precisely, the amplifier effect is less a story about unreliable humans than about design choices that create the conditions for human error: an attestation surface too coarse to localise a mistake, a propagation step with no confirmation gate, and an AI layer whose suggestions are hard to tell apart from verified fact. It is a domain-specific instance of the error-cascade problem studied in automated form-filling and decision support [23]; what makes the GRC setting acute is that the cascade terminates in regulatory assertions, so a general design failure becomes a compliance failure. A. Concrete amplification mechanism Two EU-funded platforms make the mechanism easy to inspect. CYBERFORT [5] is an open-source CRA-first GRC platform for SMEs deployed under the Digital Europe Programme. CYBER-BRIDGE [6] is a cross-border cybersecurity,

compliance and forensics platform under the same programme. Both share a question-correlation layer that, when a user answers a question, finds all transitively correlated questions inside the same scope and propagates the user’s answer and supporting evidence to every correlated question automatically.1 The correlation graph is itself partly authored by humans and partly suggested by an AI service that proposes new correlations between questions. The resulting causal chain is: (user action) answers one question → (platform) finds the transitive correlation group → (platform) writes the same answer onto N correlated questions → (platform) copies the evidence object onto N correlated answers → (output) N compliance claims across one or several frameworks. Each link is defensible in isolation. The amplified object (one human action, N compliance claims) is what the human-factor literature on self-assessment reliability has not yet had to confront. B. Why the human-factor lens matters Self-assessment reliability is already known to be limited by social-desirability bias [8], Dunning–Kruger [9], the expert– non-expert gap [10], and optimism bias under organisational incentives [11], [12]. The HFaCS workshop topic list explicitly names user compliance, adoption barriers, organisational culture and socio-technical root-cause analysis as open questions. The amplifier effect cuts across all four: it converts an individual answer-level bias into an organisation-level compliance posture with no intermediate review gate, and it does so under a UI that presents the propagation as a productivity feature rather than as a chain of inferences. The AI suggestion layer adds a second amplification: when the correlation graph itself is partly AI-authored, automation bias [13] affects which propagations ever get scrutinised by a human.

outline a measurement protocol (§VII) a consortium can run on production data, including five empirical questions. The remainder of the paper reviews self-assessment reliability and the cross-framework GRC data model (§II), describes the amplifier mechanism in code-level detail (§IV), introduces the six-dimension scoring framework (§V) and the thirteentool comparison (§VI), sketches the measurement protocol (§VII), and discusses design recommendations and threats to validity (§VIII). II. BACKGROUND A. Self-Assessment Reliability Self-assessment of cybersecurity posture inherits the same biases that decades of psychometric work have documented in survey research. Social-desirability bias [8] pushes respondents toward answers that reflect well on themselves or their organisation, particularly when the assessment is tied to a regulatory obligation. The Dunning–Kruger effect [9] predicts that the respondents least equipped to evaluate a control are also the least aware of their own gaps; Ion et al. [10] show this concretely in security, where non-experts misjudge protective behaviours relative to expert benchmarks. Optimism bias under organisational incentives [11], [12] predicts further inflation when a favourable answer reduces individual workload; Beautement et al. formalise this as the compliance budget, a finite quantity of effort employees will spend on security tasks before declining further work. Automation bias [13] predicts that respondents over-rely on a system-supplied answer even when independent evidence is available, an effect that is sharpened when the system speaks with the authority of an AI assistant [19]. In a workflow where each question is reviewed independently, these biases bound the reliability of one answer at a time. In a workflow where one answer drives many, the same biases bound the reliability of many answers at once.

C. Contributions We do not run a controlled user study; we make a designlevel risk explicit and show how it would be measured. Concretely: (1) we name and define the amplifier effect as a property of multi-framework GRC platforms with crossquestion answer propagation, and identify the four codelevel mechanisms that produce it (transitive correlation, answer synchronisation, evidence propagation, and AI-suggested new correlations); (2) we propose a six-dimension scoring framework (§V) for evaluating a tool’s exposure: attestation surface, AI-assistance depth, sign-off granularity, favourability-bias mitigation, training-transfer measurement, and self-report–telemetry corroboration; (3) we instantiate it on a thirteen-tool comparison (§VI) spanning enterprise IRM, mid-market, compliance-automation and quantification tools plus CYBERFORT and CYBER-BRIDGE [7]; and (4) we 1 Implemented as synchronize_correlated_answers and copy_evidence_files in question_correlation_service.py, verified at commit 3ec8b9d of the CYBER-BRIDGE code base; the same service is present in CYBERFORT.

B. The Multi-Framework GRC Data Model Cross-framework mapping is a core capability of modern integrated risk-management (IRM) suites [7]. ServiceNow IRM, Archer and MetricStream maintain harmonised control catalogues mapped to ISO/IEC 27001, NIS2, NIST CSF, SOC 2, GDPR, DORA and the CRA. Compliance-automation tools (Drata, Vanta, Secureframe, Hyperproof) provide similar mappings tuned to SOC 2 and ISO 27001 attestations. EUfunded SME projects, of which CYBERFORT and CYBERBRIDGE are two [5], [6], ship CRA-first mappings that overlap with ISO/IEC 27001, NIS2 and GDPR. The reuse pattern is the same across the market: a single control or evidence object satisfies many obligations. Continuous Control Monitoring (CCM) via integrations closes part of this gap by replacing periodic self-attestation with telemetry-driven evidence. CCM coverage is, however, uneven: it works well for technical controls (identity, endpoint, cloud) and poorly for organisational controls (training, awareness, governance), which is where the workshop’s adoption

and organisational culture topics live. The amplifier effect emerges precisely where CCM does not reach. III. R ELATED W ORK Self-report in security. The HAIS-Q instrument [14] and SeBIS [15] measure information-security awareness and intended behaviour through Likert self-report; both have documented social-desirability ceilings. Pfleeger and Caputo [16] review behavioural science approaches to security risk. Bada, Sasse and Nurse [17] document why awareness campaigns relying on self-attestation fail to change behaviour. The present paper extends this line by examining how the modern GRC stack multiplies the consequences of any one such answer. AI-assisted decision-making. Buçinca, Malaya and Gajos [19] show that cognitive forcing functions can reduce overreliance on AI in decision-making, an effect relevant to the AI-suggestion layer in §IV. Skitka, Mosier and Burdick [13] establish the accountability–automation-bias trade-off that underpins our recommendation R2. We use the term favourability bias (sometimes called sycophancy in the LLM literature) to denote the tendency of an AI assistant to produce overly favourable answers when prompted to advocate for the user. Compliance critique. Herley’s analysis [18] frames noncompliance as a rational rejection of advice; the compliance budget of Beautement et al. [12] formalises the finite effort employees will spend on security work. The amplifier effect extends this line: a favourable answer with amplified consequences yields a cheaper local outcome than careful perquestion scrutiny. GRC tool evaluation. Gartner’s public market listing of integrated risk-management and GRC tooling [7] provides a vendor-neutral segmentation of GRC/IRM tooling and underpins our thirteen-tool selection (§VI). Existing comparisons evaluate GRC platforms on functional breadth and on TCO; we add a human-factor dimension to that comparison. IV. T HE A MPLIFIER M ECHANISM

Fig. 1. Assessment view of CYBERFORT. The C OMMON IN line below the question lists the correlated assessments to which the user’s answer will be propagated automatically by synchronize_correlated_answers; the AI S UGGEST A NSWERS action at the top right invokes the AI-suggestion layer. The two mechanisms produce the amplifier effect described in this paper.

c) Evidence propagation: The evidence document from the original answer is copied onto every synchronised answer, so one document now substantiates all |G(q)| claims with no further review. d) AI-suggested correlations: An “AI Suggest” action asks the assistant to propose new correlation pairs. Accepted suggestions enlarge G(q), so the reach of the next single answer grows with no human review of the propagation itself. B. Numerical Sensitivity Let |F | be the number of frameworks active for the organisation and let k̄ be the mean cross-framework correlation degree of a question (empirically, k̄ ∈ [2, 5] for CRA-anchored question banks that also cover ISO/IEC 27001 and NIS2). The amplification factor of a single user answer is then A(q) = |G(q)| ≈ 1 + k̄ · (|F | − 1),

(1)

which for |F | = 4 and k̄ = 3 gives A ≈ 10. One human attestation supplies the evidentiary basis for ten compliance claims.

A. Walk-Through Both platforms treat a single answer as the unit of attestation: a value (Yes, No, Partial, Not Applicable) plus an attached evidence document, tied to one question in one assessment. When the user answers one question and saves, which is the only human action in the chain, a stored graph of question correlations drives four mechanisms that the user never reviews individually (Fig. 1). a) Transitive correlation: The platform gathers every question transitively correlated with the answered one in the same scope: if qa is correlated with qb and qb with qc , all three form one group G(q). b) Answer synchronisation: The same value is written onto every question in G(q) across the organisation’s open assessments. The user saw one save; the system records up to |G(q)| answers.

C. A Worked Example Consider an SME running CYBERFORT against CRA, ISO/IEC 27001, and NIS2 simultaneously. Suppose the correlation graph contains the following edges, generated partly by human authors and partly by the AI suggestion service: • qCRA-13a : “Does the cybersecurity risk assessment cover known vulnerabilities?” ↔ qISO-8.8 : “Is technical vulnerability management implemented?” • qISO-8.8 ↔ qNIS2-21.2e : “Are vulnerability handling and disclosure measures in place?” • qNIS2-21.2e ↔ qCRA-Annex-I-2.1 : “Are products placed on the market without known exploitable vulnerabilities?” The transitive closure groups all four questions. A user answering qCRA-13a as Yes and attaching an OSV-Scanner report as evidence triggers synchronize_correlated_answers

Fig. 2. Assessment view of the CYBER-BRIDGE platform. The same propagation pattern observed in CYBERFORT is visible here: the C OMMON IN line below each question lists the tenant assessment(s) to which the user’s answer is automatically copied, and the assigned policy plus evidence description are propagated alongside the value. The sidebar shows the broader scope of the platform (CRA scope, readiness, gap analysis, regulatory submissions, threat intelligence) over which the same amplifier mechanism operates.

to write Yes onto the other three answers, and copy_evidence_files to attach the OSV-Scanner report to each. The platform emits a single audit-trail entry per database row, but the human-factor surface is one decision. If the user mis-classified the scope of the OSV-Scanner run (e.g., it covered only one of three product components), all four claims inherit the error silently. D. The CYBER-BRIDGE Variant CYBER-BRIDGE runs the same correlation and propagation mechanism as CYBERFORT, and adds a retrievalaugmented AI assistant on top of it (Fig. 2).2 The assistant is a second amplification path: it retrieves the K questions most similar to the one being answered, drafts answers for all of them, and shows them in a single review pane; when the user accepts, K answers update at once. CYBER-BRIDGE is thus exposed to the amplifier effect through both the explicit correlation graph and the retrieval assistant, yet the user sees the same thing: one attestation, many claims. V. S IX -D IMENSION S CORING F RAMEWORK We score any GRC platform on six dimensions of exposure to the amplifier effect. Each dimension admits a four-level rubric: N ONE, L IGHT, M ODERATE, S TRONG, where higher is better. The per-tool aggregate in Table I is the rounded mean across the six dimensions, scoring N ONE=0, L IGHT=1, M ODERATE=2, S TRONG=3. 1) Attestation surface (AS): fraction of controls corroborated by Continuous Control Monitoring (CCM) rather than self-attested; S TRONG = CCM covers technical and most organisational controls, N ONE = all self-attested. 2 A pgvector embeddings store over the question bank, a local phi-4 model, and a regulatory-change search layer.

2) AI-assistance depth (AI): reverse-scored; S TRONG = AI only drafts text the human must rewrite, N ONE = AI suggests, propagates and persists with no review gate. 3) Sign-off granularity (SG): S TRONG = each propagated answer needs its own sign-off, N ONE = one signature covers a whole framework instance. 4) Favourability-bias mitigation (SM): whether the user can steer the AI toward favourable answers (sycophancy); S TRONG = a fixed, audited system prompt the user cannot override, N ONE = the user can freely instruct the AI. 5) Training-transfer measurement (TT): S TRONG = posttraining behavioural metrics feed back into the assessment, N ONE = only completion is recorded. 6) Self-report–telemetry corroboration (RT): S TRONG = contradictions between answers and telemetry are surfaced, N ONE = no corroboration. VI. T HIRTEEN -T OOL C OMPARISON We instantiate the framework on thirteen representative tools chosen to span the size-and-maturity buckets named in the GRC market analysis [7]: three enterprise IRM suites, three mid-market platforms, four compliance-automation tools, one specialised quantification suite, and the two EU-funded SME projects CYBERFORT and CYBER-BRIDGE. Scoring is drawn from public product pages and from the market analysis itself, and from direct code inspection for CYBERFORT and CYBER-BRIDGE. The tool comparison is a structured design assessment, not an empirical measurement of user behaviour. Scores should be read as indicative design-risk ratings, not as audited vendor evaluations; the evidence base for the EU SME rows is the inspected development versions of the platforms and may change as the projects mature. Three patterns emerge from Table I. First, enterprise IRM suites cluster at the top of the range because they couple deep CCM integrations (high AS, high RT) with mature sign-off workflows (SG), but they remain weak on training-transfer measurement (TT) and on favourability-bias mitigation (SM). Second, compliance-automation tools maximise CCM but provide little human-attestation structure: the auto-generated SOC 2 / ISO 27001 evidence packs come with weak SG and no SM, so a single user can drive a complete framework attestation. Third, EU SME projects CYBERFORT and CYBERBRIDGE score lowest. This is by design: their answerpropagation exists precisely to cut SME workload, and that is the feature the amplifier dimensions penalise. We flag our own tools as the most exposed because we can inspect them directly, which makes them the clearest place to measure the effect. Their scanners (SAST/DAST/SBOM) corroborate technical controls but not organisational ones such as training, so self-report there goes unchecked (RT = L IGHT/M ODERATE). The table describes where the risk sits; it is not a ranking of good and bad tools. A L IGHT score is the expected result for a tool built to cut SME workload, so it is not a failing in itself. The real concern is narrower: when weak per-answer sign-off (SG) is combined with AI writing the answers, many compliance claims can rest on very little human attestation, an

TABLE I T HIRTEEN - TOOL EXPOSURE TO THE AMPLIFIER EFFECT ACROSS SIX HUMAN - FACTOR DIMENSIONS . H IGHER IS BETTER . AS: ATTESTATION SURFACE ; AI: AI- ASSISTANCE MITIGATION ; SG: SIGN - OFF GRANULARITY; SM: FAVOURABILITY- BIAS MITIGATION ; TT: TRAINING - TRANSFER MEASUREMENT; RT: SELF - REPORT– TELEMETRY CORROBORATION . Bucket

Platform

AS

AI

SG

SM

TT

RT

Aggregate

Enterprise IRM

ServiceNow IRM Archer MetricStream

Strong Moderate Strong

Moderate Light Light

Strong Strong Moderate

Light Light Light

Light Light Light

Strong Moderate Moderate

Moderate Moderate Moderate

Mid-market

LogicGate StandardFusion Onspring

Moderate Moderate Light

Light Light Light

Moderate Moderate Moderate

Light Light Light

None None None

Moderate Moderate Light

Light–Mod Light–Mod Light

Compliance automation

Drata Vanta Hyperproof ControlMap

Strong Strong Moderate Strong

Light Light Light Light

Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate

None None None None

None None None None

Strong Strong Moderate Strong

Moderate Moderate Light–Mod Moderate

Quantification

RiskLens

Light

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

None

Light

Light–Mod

EU SME projects

CYBERFORT CYBER-BRIDGE

Light Light

None None

Light Light

None None

Light Light

Light Moderate

Light Light

outcome the regulation did not anticipate because it assumed a human meaningfully stands behind each claim. VII. M EASUREMENT P ROTOCOL A consortium that operates a production GRC deployment (such as CYBERFORT’s cohort of 43 SME tenants, 109 users and 60 framework instances [5]) can answer five empirical questions directly from its database, under an aggregate-only publication policy. Each question yields evidence on a different facet of the amplifier effect. a) Q1: answer distribution: For each FrameworkQuestion, report the empirical distribution of Answer.value across all users. A skew toward favourable values (Pr[Yes] ≫ 0.5) on questions for which no objective telemetry exists is the headline optimism-bias signal. b) Q2: time-to-answer: Compute the per-answer dwell time as ∆ti = updated_ati − created_ati . A short ∆t with a favourable value on a correlated question is the headline rubber-stamp signal. c) Q3: evidence reuse multiplicity: For each Evidence object linked to more than one Answer, report the count. A heavy-tailed distribution indicates that a small number of evidence objects substantiate a disproportionate share of the platform’s compliance claims: the single-point-of-failure signal. d) Q4: AI-assisted vs. unassisted: Where the AIassistance invocation is logged per answer, compare the answer distribution and the ∆t distribution between the AIassisted and unassisted strata. A leftward shift of ∆t without a corresponding shift in the answer distribution is consistent with automation acceleration without bias change; a shift in both is consistent with automation bias. e) Q5: favourability-bias probe: For ten representative CRA questions, prompt the platform’s LLM (Mistral 7B for CYBERFORT, phi-4 for CYBER-BRIDGE) twice: once with

a neutral-consultant system prompt, once with an “advise-theSME-favourably” prompt. Report divergence on the answer rubric. A non-zero divergence quantifies the sycophancy attack surface of the AI-assistance layer. The five questions are mechanically reproducible once instrumentation is in place. Q1–Q3 require only existing tables; Q4 may require adding a per-answer AI-invocation log; Q5 is a one-day controlled probe. VIII. D ISCUSSION A. A Usability-Heuristic Reading The amplifier effect can be restated as a set of violated usability heuristics [20]. Silent propagation breaches visibility of system status: the user is never shown that one answer became N compliance claims; the absence of a per-target confirmation breaches user control and freedom and error prevention; and surfacing AI-suggested correlations indistinguishably from human-authored ones erodes the user’s model of what the system actually knows. Read this way, the effect is a predictable consequence of omitting the confirmation, undo, and status-disclosure affordances that the human-factors literature treats as baseline, which is why we describe the propagation as an efficiency gain but not a usability one. B. Design Recommendations Three recommendations follow from the mechanism and the matrix. (R1) Review gate on propagated answers. The answer-synchronisation step should require an explicit pertarget acknowledgement when the propagated answer would change a previously filled value, or when the target question is mandatory and the source is not. (R2) AI-action audit log. Every AI invocation that touches an answer, correlation, or evidence record should be persisted with the originating user ID, the system prompt, and a hash of the AI output, to support both Q4 and external audit. (R3) Transfer measurement on

training. Cyber-range deliverables in both CYBERFORT and CYBER-BRIDGE log completion but not behavioural transfer; a mandatory post-training behavioural probe (e.g., a phishing simulation rate measured before and after) would convert the TT column from L IGHT to M ODERATE. C. Threats to Validity The scoring in Table I is derived from public sources and from direct code inspection of two platforms. We did not conduct hands-on evaluation of the eleven commercial tools; their scores reflect documented features and may be revised by trial use or vendor input, and a vendor may legitimately dispute a L IGHT score. Only CYBERFORT and CYBER-BRIDGE were assessed by direct inspection. The amplification factor in (1) is a structural upper bound; the realised amplification depends on the density of the correlation graph in deployment. The measurement protocol is described but not executed; we treat its execution as the natural next deliverable for the CYBERFORT and CYBER-BRIDGE consortia. D. Ethical and Deployment Considerations Analysing production self-assessment data carries workforce-monitoring implications. We assume the fivequestion protocol is run under aggregate-only publication, that no individual or tenant-identifiable rows leave the consortium, and that the SME tenants are informed of the analysis in their original data-sharing agreement. The sycophancy probe (Q5) is conducted on synthetic vignettes rather than on tenant answers, and poses no additional disclosure risk. IX. C ONCLUSION In this paper, we have introduced and characterised the amplifier effect in multi-framework governance, risk, and compliance platforms: the property that a single human selfassessment action, combined with cross-framework mapping and automatic answer/evidence propagation, drives many compliance assertions without a proportional increase in human review. We have described the mechanism in code-level detail for two EU-funded production platforms, proposed a sixdimension scoring framework for evaluating any GRC tool’s exposure, instantiated the framework on thirteen representative tools, and outlined a five-question measurement protocol that a consortium with access to production self-assessment data can execute. The amplifier effect is a structural property of the modern GRC stack and is tractable to measure once named. Future work will execute the measurement protocol on the CYBERFORT first cohort, report the empirical distributions of A(q) and ∆t across the deployment, and complement the log analysis with user research (think-aloud sessions and a controlled test of whether making the propagation scope visible changes attestation behaviour) to close the end-user perspective that this design-level analysis leaves open.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work has received funding from the European Union’s Digital Europe Programme under grant agreements No 101249702 (CYBER-BRIDGE) and No 101190281 (CYBERFORT). R EFERENCES [1] European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act),” Official Journal of the European Union, Nov. 2024. [2] European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2),” Official Journal, L 333, pp. 80–152, Dec. 2022. [3] European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA),” Official Journal, L 333, Dec. 2022. [4] European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (AI Act),” Official Journal, Jul. 2024. [5] N. Kekatos et al., “CYBERFORT: A compliance-chain platform operationalising the Cyber Resilience Act for SMEs,” under submission, IEEE CSR, 2026. Project page: https://cyber-fort.eu/. [6] N. Kekatos et al., “The CYBER-BRIDGE project: an AI-powered platform for cross-border cybersecurity, compliance and forensics in the EU,” under submission, IEEE CSR, 2026. Project page: https: //cyber-bridge.eu/. [7] Gartner, “Integrated risk management solutions reviews and ratings,” Gartner Peer Insights, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.gartner. com/reviews/market/integrated-risk-management (accessed Jul. 2026). [8] D. L. Paulhus, “Measurement and control of response bias,” in Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Attitudes, J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, and L. S. Wrightsman, Eds. Academic Press, 1991, pp. 17– 59. [9] J. Kruger and D. Dunning, “Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one’s own incompetence lead to inflated selfassessments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 77, no. 6, pp. 1121–1134, Dec. 1999. [10] I. Ion, R. Reeder, and S. Consolvo, “. . . no one can hack my mind: comparing expert and non-expert security practices,” in Proc. SOUPS, 2015, pp. 327–346. [11] A. Adams and M. A. Sasse, “Users are not the enemy,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 42, no. 12, pp. 40–46, Dec. 1999. [12] A. Beautement, M. A. Sasse, and M. Wonham, “The compliance budget: managing security behaviour in organisations,” in Proc. NSPW, 2008, pp. 47–58. [13] L. J. Skitka, K. Mosier, and M. D. Burdick, “Accountability and automation bias,” International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 701–717, Apr. 2000. [14] K. Parsons et al., “The human aspects of information security questionnaire (HAIS-Q): two further validation studies,” Computers & Security, vol. 66, pp. 40–51, 2017. [15] S. Egelman and E. Peer, “Scaling the security wall: developing a security behavior intentions scale (SeBIS),” in Proc. ACM CHI, 2015, pp. 2873– 2882. [16] S. L. Pfleeger and D. D. Caputo, “Leveraging behavioral science to mitigate cyber security risk,” Computers & Security, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 597–611, 2012. [17] M. Bada, A. M. Sasse, and J. R. C. Nurse, “Cyber security awareness campaigns: why do they fail to change behaviour?” arXiv:1901.02672, 2019. [18] C. Herley, “So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of security advice by users,” in Proc. NSPW, 2009, pp. 133– 144. [19] Z. Buçinca, M. B. Malaya, and K. Z. Gajos, “To trust or to think: cognitive forcing functions can reduce overreliance on AI in AI-assisted decision-making,” in Proc. ACM Human-Computer Interaction (CSCW), vol. 5, no. CSCW1, art. 188, 2021. [20] J. Nielsen, “Enhancing the explanatory power of usability heuristics,” in Proc. ACM CHI, 1994, pp. 152–158.

[21] Secure Controls Framework Council, “Secure Controls Framework (SCF): a cybersecurity and privacy metaframework mapping 1,500+ controls to 200+ laws, regulations and frameworks,” 2025. [Online]. Available: https://securecontrolsframework.com/ (accessed Jul. 2026). [22] S. Hu, P. Wang, K. I. Chan, Y. Yao, and Z. Lu, “I always felt that something was wrong: understanding compliance risks and mitigation

strategies when highly-skilled compliance knowledge workers use large language models,” arXiv:2411.04576, 2024. [23] K. Goddard, A. Roudsari, and J. C. Wyatt, “Automation bias: a systematic review of frequency, effect mediators, and mitigators,” Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 121–127, 2012.

Related documents

• The Amplifier Effect: Human-Factor Risks of AI-Suggested Correlation and Auto-Propagation in Multi-Framework GRC Self-Assessment#1217601
• Benchmarking and Delegated Benchmarks: Aligning Incentives and Total-Fund Outcomes#1374653
• CurricuVLM: Towards Safe Autonomous Driving via Personalized Safety-Critical Curriculum Learning with Vision-Language Models#1075973
• The Psychology of Compliance#732194
• Free Will as Governance : A Graded, Embodied Compatibilism#100252