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Benchmarking and Delegated Benchmarks: Aligning Incentives and Total-Fund Outcomes
This chapter examines benchmarking as a central governance mechanism in a Total Portfolio Approach. Rather than treating benchmarks as neutral scorekeeping devices, it shows how they define accountability, shape incentives, influence risk-taking, and affect collaboration across investment teams. The
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