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Reduced Forms: Feasibility, Extremality, Optimality
We study independent private values auction settings with heterogeneous bidders, revenue nonlinear in interim winning probabilities, and place no ad hoc restrictions on auctions that a seller can use. We show that feasibility of interim winning probabilities is testable along a unidimensional princi
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