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On the Complexity of Mixed Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors
We show that computing an approximate mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a discrete first-price auction with correlated priors is PPAD-complete. The key intermediate step in our reduction is the PPAD-completeness of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in a new normal-form game, the hypergraph dis
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