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Self-Referenced Social Preferences: Cooperation without Observing Others Rewards
Social preferences can promote cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning, but existing approaches often require agents to observe the rewards of their peers. In many real-world interactions, however, an agent can, as humans do, observe others' behavior and outcomes without access to their pr
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