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Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination
We study allocation mechanisms that utilize costly signaling as a screening tool. A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the weighted sum of agents' utilities, while implementing a specific allocation rule. Within a broad class of agent preferences, we show that coordination me
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