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Strategy-proof voting schemes under single-peaked preferences over intervals
When a subset of alternatives is allowed to be the collective choice, one approach is to study the social choice correspondence defined on agents' preferences over alternatives. This paper considers a different approach. We argue that agents should have preferences directly over outcomes. We conside
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