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Open problem: Computing Bayes-Nash equilibrium in simple security games
This is an open problem originally posed during the program "Economics and Computation" held in the Fall 2015 semester at the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing. It asks whether a (Bayes-)Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time for Bayesian simple security games.
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