arXiv (All)
open access
Large player classes and approximately weighted voting
It is known that completeness of the coalitional ($C$-)desirability relation in a simple game does not imply the existence of a weighted-majority representation. We show that weightedness is implied in an approximate sense. Call an $n$-player simple game $\varepsilon$-weighted if, for some weight ve
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions#752569
- Agent-Relative Consequentialism and Collective Self-Defeat#738689
- Refuting equivalence in probabilistic programs with conditioning#1039244
- A composite generalization of Ville's martingale theorem using e-processes#792584
- A composite generalization of Ville's martingale theorem using e-processes#788584
Record · ID 1233007
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive