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Index and Robustness of Mixed Equilibria: An Algebraic Approach
We present two results regarding the relation of the index of equilibria and the index of fixed points, and the index of equilibria and payoff-robustness: any integer can be the index of an isolated completely mixed equilibrium of a finite game. In a particular class of isolated completely mixed equ
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