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Correlated Perfect Equilibrium
We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on common perturbations of the mediator's recommendation distribution, which we call correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPEs is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex polyhedra. Like perfect equilibrium, a CP
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