The Beginning of the Universe Does Not Settle the Beginning of Reality

This paper argues that the beginning of the universe does not settle the beginning of reality. A first boundary in cosmic time may mark the earliest point in our universe, or the earliest point we can measure within it, without thereby proving that reality as such begins there. The paper distinguishes these claims and argues that they are too often collapsed. It then contends that if our universe has a real beginning, some further order must exist relative to which that beginning is real. That is enough to block the easy inference from cosmic beginning to metaphysical ultimacy. The paper further argues that absolute nothing cannot ground cosmogenesis, because it contains no structure within which the difference between not-this-universe and this-universe could be real. Two live metaphysical options remain: infinite regress of containing orders, or a beginningless deeper substrate. While the strict argument does not decide between them, the latter is tentatively presented as the more plausible of the two.