HAL (France)
open access
Reference-point effects in bargaining
This paper investigates whether an earned endowment can serve as a salient reference point in unstructured bargaining and thereby reshape focal agreements. In a laboratory experiment with 166 participants, subjects earn endowments in a real-effort task, and subsequent bargaining menus are framed as
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Enforceability Reverses the Effect of Bargaining Power on Team Performance#442331
- The Effects of Pair Budget Goal Difficulty and Pair Identity on Decision-Making and Performance#939146
- Love, Hurts: How Third-Party Fine Payments Challenge the Integrity of Collective Bargaining Agreements in the NFL#416946
- Bargaining with Absentmindedness#1110115
- Trust and reciprocity in incentive contracting#1274774
Record · ID 1251167
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive