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Trust and reciprocity in incentive contracting
Principals can attempt to get agents to perform certain actions preferable to the principal by using ex post punishments or rewards to align incentives. Field data is mixed on whether, and to what extent, such informal incentive contracting (paradoxically) crowds out efficient solutions to the agen
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Related documents
- The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model#10543
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