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Tax Evasion and Coordination
We consider corporate tax evasion as a decision affecting business partners. There are costs of uncoordinated tax reports, both in terms of catching inspectors' attention and running accounts. If these costs are small, there exist a unique Nash equilibrium of the game between the tax authority and a
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