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Social Interaction in Tax Evasion
We analyze the tax evasion problem with social interaction among the taxpayers. If the authority commits to a fixed auditing probability, a positive share of cheating is obtained in equilibrium. This stands in contrast to the existing literature, which yields full compliance of audited taxpayers who
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