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One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem that allows for the prospect of being single, and study the existence and properties of stable matchings. We obtain the relationship between the stable set, the core, and the Pareto set, and give a suf
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