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Subjective Performance Evaluation and Collusion
This paper considers a principal-agent relationship and explores the incentive provision when the agent's performance cannot be verified. It contrasts two alternatives for the principal to provide incentives: (i) to subjectively evaluate the agent's performance; and (ii), to delegate this task to a
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Record · ID 1274984
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