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An experimental analysis of moral hazard in team
This paper reports 5 laboratory sessions that analyze the effects of group sizes in the voluntary contribution mechanism, when contribution level is either complementary or substitute. The theorical argument is that each production function provides different incentives for the agent along scale cha
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