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Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets
We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among all
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