Munich Personal RePEc Archive
metadata only
Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Labor Market Equilibrium when Workers can Self-Insure
I develop an equilibrium matching model in which workers have preferences over consumption and hours of work and are able to self-insure against unemployment risks by accumulating precautionary wealth. Wages and working hours are the outcomes of Nash bargaining between workers and firms. I focus on
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The Power of Simple Mechanisms: A Tight $e$-Approximation for Gains from Trade in Matching Markets#1142298
- Optimal State-Contingent Unemployment Insurance#1275020
- Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999)#1277276
- Optimal Unemployment Insurance When Income Effects are Large#127221
- If it's not your talent, how come you're getting an incentive?#707258
Record · ID 1276391
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive