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Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership
We study the initial assignment of ownership of a good. When the good is sold at the market-clearing price, wealthy agents may acquire it instead of poor agents who value it more highly, all else equal. Non-market assignment schemes such as random rationing may allocate the good more efficiently tha
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