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Strategic Price Discounting and Rationing in Uniform Price Auctions
Uniform price auctions admit a continuum of collusive seeming equilibria due to bidders' market power. In this paper, I modify the auction rules in allowing the seller to ration strategic bidders in order to ensure small bidders' participation. I show that many of these "bad" equilibria disappear wh
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