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INFORMATION ADVANTAGE IN STACKELBERG DUOPOLY UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY
We consider a Stackelberg model under demand slope uncertainty in an environment where the follower owns information advantage. Specifically, we show that the second mover obtains higher expected profit than the first mover when the leader only knows the prior beliefs and the follower gains the post
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