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Common Agency with Risk-Averse Agent
I consider a common agency model under adverse selection with a risk averse agent. Contracting takes place ex ante when all players have symmetric, although incomplete, information. The coordination problem between principals leads to more distortion in the optimal policy from the first best compare
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