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Incentive Design for Multi-Agent Systems: A Bilevel Optimization Framework for Coordinating Independent Agents and Convergence Analysis
Incentive design aims to guide the performance of a system towards a human's intention or preference. We study this problem in a multi-agent system with one leader and multiple followers. Each follower independently solves a mdp to maximize its own expected total return with the same state space and
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